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(1) the collection and as-
sembly of pre-existing ma-
terial, facts, or data; (2) the 
selection, coordination, and 
arrangement of those mate-
rials; and (3) the creation, 
by virtue of the particular 
selection, coordination, or 
arrangement, of an "origi-
nal" work of authorship. Id. 
The Court noted that the first and 
third elements were self-explana-
tory. The key issue was found in the 
second element: "whether the selec-
tion, coordination, and arrangement 
are sufficiently original to merit pro-
tection." Id. at 1294. The Court 
noted that the language, "in such a 
way," suggested that some compi-
lations would be copyrightable while 
others would not. Id. Relying on 
precedent, the Court justified that 
every clause and word of a statute 
should be given effect. Id. (citing 
Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 
1032 (1991». 
The Court held that alphabetiz-
ing surnames for white pages did 
not satisfy the minimum constitu-
tional standards for copyright pro-
tection and was "devoid of even the 
slightest trace of creativity." Id. at 
1296. The selection of surnames, 
the Court found, was obvious and 
"lacks the modicum of creativity 
necessary to transform mere selec-
tion into copyrightable expression." 
Id. Moreover, Rural did not "se-
lect" to publish the surnames in its 
directory, but was required by state 
statute to publish the names and 
telephone numbers of its subscrib-
ers. !d. at 1296-97. Lastly, the 
Court noted that alphabetizing by 
surname was "an age-old practice, 
firmly rooted in tradition and so 
commonplace that it has come to be 
expected as a matter of course." Id. 
at 1297. 
The Supreme Court's holding in 
Feist allows publishers of white page 
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listings to pilfer from theircompeti-
tors simply because the surnames 
were alphabetized, thereby lacking 
originality. Although Feist and 
Rural made their profit exclusively 
from yellow page advertisements, 
many other directories exist where 
the publishers profit solely from the 
directories themselves. Knowing 
that a rival may simply reproduce 
and profit from one's compilation 
may result in publishers engaging in 
other forms of publication which 
are less vulnerable to piracy by com-
petitors. 
- Kimberly A. Doyle 
Harmelin v. Michigan: MAN-
DATORY SENTENCE OF 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
DOES NOT VIOLATE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
In the plurality opinion of 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 
2680 (1991), the United States Su-
preme Court held that a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison withoutthe 
possibility of parole did not violate 
the Eighth Amendment's proscrip-
tion against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. In its analysis, the Court 
reviewed the history of the Eighth 
Amendment in order to determine 
whether a mandatory sentence could 
be imposed without considering 
mitigating factors. The Court re-
fused to extend the so-called "indi-
vidualized capital-sentencing doc-
trine" to cases other than those im-
posing the death penalty. 
Ronald Harmelin was convicted 
of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. 
Although Harmelin had no prior 
convictions, he received a manda-
tory sentence of life in prison with-
out the possibility of parole pursu-
ant to Michigan law. The Michigan 
Court of Appeals reversed 
Harmelin's conviction on the 
grounds that evidence in support of 
the conviction was obtained in vio-
lation of Michigan's Constitution. 
On petition for rehearing, however, 
the court of appeals vacated its re-
versal and affirmed HarmeIin's sen-
tence. The Michigan Supreme Court 
denied leave to appeal, and the 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 
Harmelin set forth two reasons 
that his sentence was unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. First, 
Harmelin contended that the sen-
tence was unconstitutional because 
the punishment was significantly 
disproportionate to the crime com-
mitted. Id. Second, Harmelin ar-
gued that the sentence violated the 
Eighth Amendment because it was 
mandatory, and therefore, precluded 
the trial judge from considering any 
particular circumstance of the crime 
and the criminal. Specifically, 
Harmelin contended that it was cruel 
and unusual to impose such a se-
vere, mandatory sentence as life 
imprisonment without considering 
mitigating factors. 
To begin its analysis, a plurality 
of the court held that "[ s levere, man-
datory penalties may be cruel, but 
they are not unusual in the constitu-
tional sense .... " The Court noted 
that our nation's history has long 
provided examples of mandatory 
penalties, including death sentences. 
Id. The Court reasoned, therefore, 
that a sentence which was not other-
wise cruel and unusual did not be-
come such simply because it was 
mandatory. Id. 
The Court then considered 
whether the Eighth Amendment re-
quired an individualized sentencing 
determination that the punishment 
imposed be appropriate to the crime 
committed. Id. The Court noted 
that such an individualized sentenc-
ing determination was, in fact, ap-
plicable in capital cases, and impo-
sition of the death penalty without 
this individualized sentencing de-
termination was cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
The Court refused, however, to ex-
tend this individualized sentencing 
determination beyond capital cases. 
Id. at 2702. 
The Court reasoned that the death 
penalty "differs from all other forms 
of criminal punishment, not in de-
gree, but in kind. It is unique in its 
total irrevocability." Id. (quoting 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
306 (1972». The Court explained 
that even with a sentence of life 
without possibility of parole, there 
still existed possibilities of execu-
tive clemency and legislative reduc-
tion of sentences to take effect retro-
actively. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 
2702. The Court further noted that 
the following sentences could pro-
duce only negligible differences: life 
with parole eligibility in twenty 
years, long-term sentences without 
eligibility of parole for a 65-year-
old man, and a life sentence without 
parole. Id. The Court reasoned that 
regardless of the difference, no sen-
tence could be compared with death, 
and, thus, the Court refused to ex-
pand individualized sentencing be-
yond capital cases. The Court held, 
therefore, that a mandatory sentence 
of life in prison without the possi-
bility of parole did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
In a strong dissent, Justice White 
asserted that while the Eighth 
Amendment contained no specific 
language as to a proportionality re-
quirement, it did forbid excessive 
fines. Id. at 2709. (White, J., dis-
senting). Justice White noted that it 
would not be unreasonable to find 
that excessiveness should be mea-
sured according to the crime com-
mitted, concluding that imposing 
any punishment disproportionate to 
the crime committed would be a 
violation of the Eighth 
Amendment's cruel and unusual 
punishment clause. Id. Justice White 
reasoned that "[t]he death penalty is 
appropriate in some cases and not in 
others. The same should be true of 
punishment by imprisonment." Id. 
at 2712. 
In a plurality opinion, the Su-
preme Court found that a mandatory 
sentence did not automatically be-
come cruel and unusual by virtue of 
its mandatory nature. The Court 
distinguished capital cases, where 
an individualized sentencing deter-
mination is mandatory, from all other 
forms of punishment, where such a 
determination is not required. Thus, 
the Court refused to extend the indi-
vidualized capital sentencing doc-
trine beyond death penalty cases. In 
so doing, the Court gave great lati-
tude to state legislatures for deter-
mination of reasonable punishments 
while usurping a sentencingjudge's 
ability to consider any mitigating 
factors the defendant may wish to 
present. 
- Ellen Poris 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company v. Haslip: MASSIVE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AWARD INTENDED TO 
PUNISH AND DETER 
WRONGDOERS IN CIVIL 
SUIT DID NOT VIOLATE 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT. 
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032(1991), 
the United States Supreme Court 
held that a $1,040,000.00 punitive 
damages award, which was more 
than four times the amount of com-
pensatory damages claimed, did not 
violate the Due Process Clause of 
of whether due process acts as a 
check on undue jury discretion to 
award punitive damages in the ab-
sence of any express statutory limit. 
Lemmie L. Ruffin, Jr. was a li-
censed agent for both Pacific Mu-
tual Life Insurance Company (Pa-
cific Mutual) and Union Fidelity 
Life Insurance Company (Union). 
After selling an insurance package 
to the respondents, both employees 
of an Alabama municipality, Ruffin 
misappropriated premiums paid to 
him by respondents' employer for 
payment to Union. This caused 
respondent's health insurance to 
lapse without their knowledge. 
In May 1982, respondents filed 
an action in state court claiming 
fraud by Ruffin and seeking to hold 
Pacific Mutual liable under a theory 
of respondeat superior. Following 
the trial court's charge on liability, 
the jury was instructed that if it 
determined there was liability for 
fraud, it could award punitive dam-
ages. The jury was further instructed 
that the purpose of punitive dam-
ages was not to compensate the plain-
tiff, but rather to punish the defen-
dant and deter him from doing such 
wrong in the future. 
Included among the damages was 
a verdict for Respondent Haslip of 
over one million dollars. This sum 
included a punitive damages award 
more than four times the amount of 
compensatory damages claimed. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama af-
firmed the trial court and specifi-
cally upheld the punitive damages 
award. The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to review 
Pacific Mutual's claim that the pu-
nitive damage award was the prod-
uct of unbridled jury discretion and 
violative of its due process rights. 
The Court first addressed the 
the Fourteenth Amendment. After constitutionalityofthepunitivedam-
circumventing the issue in the past, ages and outlined the common-law 
the Court finally addressed the issue approach for assessing them. Under 
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